• Circularidades económicas y observación de segundo orden: La realidad de las calificaciones crediticias
  • Economic Circularities and Second-Order Observation: The Reality of Ratings
Elena Esposito

Resumen

¿Pueden los observadores observar la economía desde el exterior? Desarrollos recientes en la sociología económica tienden a desdibujar la clásica distinción y combinación entre economía y sociedad, y a avanzar hacia un modelo en el que el observador se encuentra necesariamente dentro de la sociedad que él describe. El comportamiento de los agentes financieros se puede analizar mediante la combinación de dos conceptos: el concurso de belleza y el riesgo moral –una combinación que permite una traducción de su comportamiento en los términos y tradición de la teoría de la observación. El concurso de belleza de Keynes puede ser interpretado como un reconocimiento sistemático de la observación de segundo orden: los operadores financieros observan principalmente a otros observadores y lo que estos observan. Esta observación produce circularidades peculiares –incluyendo el insoluble problema del riesgo moral, el cual reproduce el famoso modelo de Merton de las profecías autocumplidas y autofrustradas en el campo de las finanzas. Sin embargo, si las finanzas consisten en observaciones de segundo orden, entonces sus movimientos no pueden ser explicados más con referencia al mundo, sino con referencia a la observación y sus estructuras: la referencia a la realidad de las finanzas es proporcionada crecientemente por calificaciones crediticias que solo pueden ofrecer información respecto de lo que los demás observan. La expansión de las calificaciones crediticias en las últimas décadas y las dudas sobre su fiabilidad están relacionadas con el movimiento generalizado de la sociedad moderna hacia la observación de segundo orden, lo cual produce problemas y enigmas específicos, así como estructuras y restricciones.

Abstract

Can observers observe the economy from the outside? Recent developments in economic sociology tend to blur the classic distinction and combination of economy and society and to move to a model in which the observer is necessarily inside the society he describes. The behavior of financial actors can then be analyzed by combining two concepts: beauty contest and moral hazard - a combination that allows for a translation of their behavior into the terms and the tradition of observation theory. Keynes' beauty contest can be interpreted as a systematic recognition of second-order observation: financial op­erators primarily observe other observers and what they observe. This observation produces particular circularities - including the insoluble problem of moral hazard, which reproduces Merton's famous model of self-defeating/self-fulfilling prophecies in the field of finance. If finance consists in second-order observation, however, then its movements can no longer be explained in reference to the world, but in reference to observation and its structures: the reality reference of finance is increasingly provided by ratings, which can only offer information concerning what others observe. The spread of ratings in recent decades and the doubts about their reliability are related to the generalized move of modern so­ciety to second-order observation, which produces specific problems and specific puzzles, as well as structures and constraints.

Palabras clave

Teoría de la Observación; Incrustación; Performatividad; Calificaciones Crediticias; Finanzas; Concurso de Belleza, Riesgo Moral

keywords

Observation Theory; Embeddedness; Performativity; Ratings; Finance; Beauty Contest; Moral Hazard

Texto completo: HTML PDF

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DOI: 10.5354/0718-0527.2014.30960